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Abstract  
This article aims at providing an account of the social organisation of the cigarette 
counterfeiting business in the People‟s Republic of China; a business that has been feeding 
the cigarette black markets around the globe. Specifically, we aim to exhibit the scale and 
nature of cigarette counterfeiting in mainland China, describe the practices and actors in the 
different phases of the trade, and examine the role of corruption and violence in the particular 
business. We argue that cigarette counterfeiting is one of the side-effects of China‟s reform 
and „opening up‟ policy, and a feature of the country‟s economic development process.  
 




The illegal trade in tobacco products is a phenomenon that only recently has gained some 
prominence and despite the fact that it has a much longer history. There are three main 
schemes characterising this trade in the last two decades: a) bootlegging - buying an amount 
of cigarettes that exceeds custom regulations; b) Large-scale smuggling - of untaxed 
cigarettes diverted from licit international trade, and c) counterfeiting – or the manufacturing 
of fake brand cigarettes (Joossens, 1999; von Lampe, 2006). This article focuses on the third 
scheme and aims at providing an account of the social organisation of the counterfeiting 
business in the People‟s Republic of China (hereafter China), generally believed to be the 
main source for counterfeit cigarettes worldwide. According to recent estimates, up to 400 
billion counterfeit cigarettes are produced in China per year (Chen, 2009; Joossens et al., 
2009), representing roughly the number of cigarettes (legal and contraband) consumed in the 
UK over a six-year period. China has criminalised cigarette counterfeiting through a net of 
general and specific laws and regulations. Section 140 (chapter 3) of the Chinese Criminal 
Law of 1997 has made the production and trade of counterfeit goods in general an „Offence 
that Undermines the Socialist Market Economy‟ punishable by a range of possible sentences 
from fine to life imprisonment. In addition, the Chinese Law of Tobacco Exclusive Sale 
stipulates that legal traders who sell counterfeit tobacco products must be fined at 50% of the 
market value of the counterfeit products seized. There are also a number of regional and local 
legislations, and administrative regulations governing cigarette counterfeiting such as the 
2003 Jiangsu Provincial Council Resolution of Tobacco Exclusive Sale Management. 
There is a wide perception that cigarette counterfeiting in China has been increasing 
and that no part of mainland China has remained immune from such activity. Governmental 
agencies, media and tobacco manufacturers portray cigarette counterfeiting – just as other 
illegal tobacco-related activities - as the business of serious „organised criminals‟ and of 
threatening „criminal organisations‟ (Chow, 2003), and a pessimistic picture has been painted 
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by the authorities as far as measures against the cigarette counterfeiting business are 
concerned. At the National Anti-Cigarette Counterfeiting Conference held in 2008, Zhang, 
the Deputy Chief of the National Tobacco Exclusive Sale Bureau pointed out: 
 
“…the situation of cigarette counterfeiting in China is severe. In the hot spot areas cigarette 
counterfeiting has not been attacked effectively. Counterfeiting networks are operating. 
Materials are re-supplied after the law enforcement crackdowns, and there is smooth and 
frequent counterfeit cigarette distribution…Cigarette counterfeiting cannot be solved 
essentially within a short period of time so we cannot be over-optimistic…and should be 
prepared for the longer term battle against this illicit activity…” (Zhang, 2008).  
 
China‟s leading role in cigarette counterfeiting cannot be understood without 
considering the broader social and economic importance of tobacco in this country. China has 
the largest smoking population in the world reaching approximately 300 million or one third 
of the world smokers (Tobacco Free Centre, 2009). It has also been suggested that Chinese 
smokers spend 3% of per capita GDP on tobacco (Wang, 2006; Hu et al., 2005), often at the 
expense of other, more vital commodities and services (Hu et al., 2008). This huge market 
has traditionally been supplied almost exclusively by domestic sources. Until recently, 
foreign cigarettes accounted for only an extremely small share of the legal market (e.g. only 
0.8% from 1995 to 1999) as a result of high tariffs on cigarette imports (Hu and Mao, 2002). 
It was not until 2004 that these tariffs have been substantially lowered (Euromonitor 
International, no date). These barriers to imports, it seems, have encouraged the smuggling 
and counterfeiting of foreign brands. In fact, there is some evidence that the counterfeit 
business has profited from expertise originally acquired from smuggling Western brand 
cigarettes into China during the 1990s (Chen, 2009). Given the alleged corporate involvement 
(Lee & Collin, 2006) one could say that China‟s counterfeit business of today in a way is the 
sorcerer‟s apprentice of the Western tobacco industry. 
Given the size of its domestic market it is not surprising that China is the biggest 
tobacco producer in the world, but also one of the most important exporters of cigarettes 
(Onder, 2002).  
The tobacco industry is an extremely important economic sector in China. Organised 
as a state monopoly, it contributes significantly to the Chinese economy and provides 
substantial revenues for the central government and local governments, although at a 
declining rate (Hu et al., 2009; Wang, 2006). In 2005, 7.6 % of the central government‟s total 
revenue came from a combination of tobacco taxes and monopoly profits, compared to 
11.4 % in 1995 (Hu et al., 2009). Because local governments receive their share of revenues 
primarily from taxes on tobacco leaves rather than on cigarettes they have an incentive to 
encourage farmers to increase the production of tobacco beyond set quotas, thus creating a 
source of raw tobacco for the manufacturing of counterfeit cigarettes (Hu et al., 2007; 2009). 
Tobacco provides income for millions of Chinese people. According to Wang (2006), 
4.1 million rural households are involved in the cultivation of tobacco, and five million 
(licensed) tobacco selling points create job opportunities in the private sector. The 
manufacturing industry, however, is less significant in this respect. Wang (2006) gives a 
recent figure of only 215,600 workers involved in the (legal) production of cigarettes, 
marking a continuous decline. Since 2001, when China joined the WTO, the administration 
has pursued an aggressive agenda to restructure the tobacco industry. The aim has been to 
establish a small number of large-scale tobacco enterprises with an ability to compete against 
major international brands. In the process, numerous small and inefficient factories have been 
closed down (Euromonitor International, 2008; Hu et al., 2009). One apparent consequence 
of the restructuring of the legal tobacco industry is that a sizeable workforce of skilled 
3 
 
labourers as well as production machinery has been made available for the illicit tobacco 
business. 
A third historically developed characteristic of the Chinese tobacco industry may have 
contributed to the emergence of large-scale illegal cigarette trading: the high level of 
regulation. As indicated, despite China‟s shift to a market economy thirty years ago, the 
tobacco industry in the country is highly regulated by the central government, and 
specifically the State Tobacco Monopoly Administration (STMA). The state company under 
the title China National Tobacco Corporation (CNTC) and a number of smaller companies 
(such as China Cigarette Sales & Marketing Corporation and China Tobacco Materials 
Corporation) are subjected to this authority. The regulation provides numerous impediments 
to individual entrepreneurs wishing to be involved in the legal business. Specifically, a 
Permit of Exclusive Sale of Tobacco is required before a legal tobacco selling business can 
be opened, a procedure which is lengthy and difficult because these legal requirements and 
processes are sometimes affected by corruption (see Caijin, 2008). The formidable 
difficulties involved in obtaining a tobacco exclusive sale permits, it seems, in part account 
for the existence of the illicit cigarette business. 
Of great relevance to this study is the cultural meaning of cigarettes (and other 
tobacco products) in Chinese society. Tobacco is a commodity that is often associated with 
success and affluence, and has been used as a lubricant of social relationships and an 
„instrument‟ of bribery (see Tomson and Coulter, 1987). Particularly, international and 
Chinese expensive brands of cigarettes have been traditionally purchased as gifts, for 
example, on important occasions. In fact, counterfeit production and sales are said to peak 
around the New Year and spring festival celebrations (China Daily, 2004). 
Another aspect, defining the broader environment under which the illegal cigarette 
business flourishes in China, is the global demand for cheap cigarettes. Since the late 1990s, 
large quantities of counterfeit cigarettes from China have been introduced to illegal cigarette 
markets around the world, thus rendering China an important node in the global illegal 
tobacco trade. Although there are indications that the production of counterfeit cigarettes has 
increased in other Asian countries and Eastern Europe as well as Germany and UK (see von 
Lampe, 2006), China remains the major source country for this particular commodity (Chen, 
2009; SOCA, 2009). However, although there is a considerable amount of publications on 
tobacco and health issues, tobacco economics, and the complicity of tobacco manufacturers 
in the illegal tobacco trade in China, there is comparatively little being published on the 
social organisation of the cigarette counterfeiting business in the country. This perhaps 
reflects the relatively slow development of criminology in China, and Asia in general, 
compared to the western world (see Liu, 2009; 2008). Our aim is to contribute to the research 
on the cigarette counterfeiting business in China. Specifically, we aim to: (a) describe the 
scale and nature of cigarette counterfeiting in the mainland China; (b) discuss the practices 
and actors during the different phases of the trade; and (c) examine the role of corruption and 
violence in cigarette counterfeiting. We argue that cigarette counterfeiting is one of the side-




Data and Methods 
As noted above, there is very little empirical research and evidence on illegal cigarette-related 
activities including cigarette counterfeiting in China. Various researchers (e.g. Heimer & 
Thøgersen, 2006; Liu, 2008) have identified the historical, cultural and political obstacles in 
attempting to conduct empirical criminological research in China. Criminological research 
was openly forbidden in China for 27 years prior to 1979 (Bakken, 2000). But even after 
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1979 research has been suffering from what Klein and Gatz (1989: 175) call “bureaucratic 
inflexibilities”. Public officials are not encouraged to disclose information about crime-
related matters; neither are they willing to express their personal views on any potentially 
sensitive matter which may jeopardise the image of the agency they work for or the state. 
There is the general problem that there are few incentives for criminal entrepreneurs to 
participate in research interviews. This is even more the case in China, where criminals have 
been traditionally seen as the „enemy of the state and its people‟ (Davies & Shen, 2009). 
There are technical restrictions for Chinese and non-Chinese researchers as well: there are 34 
provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities and special economic zones in China. 
Combined with the wide dispersal of the population, there are ethnic differences and an 
extremely diverse context, which does not allow generalisations to be made when researching 
one area, while financial costs make empirical research in all areas an even more difficult 
endeavour. In addition to these impediments to prospective research, these geographic and 
demographic features, along with the circumspect attitude of the Chinese state, have ensured 
that statistical information is not collected and disseminated by the Chinese bureaucratic 
apparatus, at least to the extent of other countries (Brewer et al., 1996). 
Therefore, the information supporting this study is drawn from open sources. Open 
sources have been used in previous works on illegal tobacco trade in general (see von Lampe, 
2006). Apart from a general literature and internet search, we searched the news reports from 
the website of Xinhua Ribao – one of China‟s major official newspapers (http://www.news.cn) 
by using the keywords „cigarette counterfeiting‟. We obtained 381 cigarette counterfeiting-
related news articles which were collected from a variety of online sources from 11 May 
2001 to 22 September 2009. We also conducted a random online search by using the 
keywords „cigarette counterfeiting in <name of province> ‟. The purpose of this was to obtain 
cigarette counterfeiting cases detected in the provinces that are not included in the Xinhua 
database. This search added another 106 news articles to our database. 
The cases we have cited in this paper are drawn from the news articles carefully 
selected from our initial search. Through the initial search, we also identified a handful of 
surveys conducted by journalists from newspapers such as Caijun Ribao, Shichang Bao and 
Chengshi Wanbao. Likewise, a large amount of data was collected from a tobacco-specialised 
website, namely Tobacco China (http://www.tobaccochina.com). In addition, we searched all 
China‟s tobacco authority official websites, including the website of the National Tobacco 
Exclusive Sale Bureau (NTESB) which has published annual reports from 2003 to 2008. 
These reports contain statistics on (a) the number of cases detected, (b) the number of 
counterfeiting sites, (c) the number of rolling machines seized, (d) tons of tobacco leaves 
seized, (e) the number of units of cigarettes seized, and (f) the number of people arrested and 
sentenced for cigarette counterfeiting from 2002 to 2007.  
The sources were carefully selected in order to cover cigarette counterfeiting in all 
provinces of mainland China. The reason why the data we use for this study do not include 
Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan is because they constitute special administrative and –
primarily- economic zones that have adopted different policies and practices. Overall, these 
three areas are discernibly different from mainland China in terms of their historical, socio-
political and economic features. 
The fact that the first author of this article is of Chinese origin and can read Chinese 
provided us with the opportunity to use sources that are not easily accessible by westerners. 
On the other hand, the sources we have used refer to only those cases which the authorities 
came across thus ignoring cases of successful counterfeiters. There is a possibility, therefore, 
that the official and media accounts are biased towards the least successful counterfeiting 
schemes, and may also be presenting the issues relating to the actors of the counterfeiting 
business in a sensational and morally charged manner. Although China is hardly an exception 
5 
 
to the sensational manner in which crime is treated in official and media accounts, Zhong 
(2009: 109) has already argued that official, media and even academic accounts in China “are 
replete with language of strong moral flavour, in line with the strongly moralistic quality of 
the whole society”. We note here that we have not adopted our sources‟ representations of the 
entities involved in the business; we only use the purely „technical‟ information to make 
inferences. Finally, we acknowledge that besides the „standard‟ limitations of official data 
there are a number of China-specific issues relating to criminal statistics. Apart from the fact 
that data are not readily and widely available, the little data that are available to researchers is 
impossible to assess due to lack of knowledge of or ambiguity about the data collection 
procedures as well as due to conscious practices on the part of the authorities to manipulate 
data towards serving their hidden agendas and meeting their political or other objectives 
(Bakken, 2005). Despite the limitations of these data however, we think they are worthy of 
examination. 
 
The scale of the cigarette counterfeiting business in China 
NTESB annual reports (NTESB 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008) and China Tobacco 
Market (2009) provide some data on cigarette counterfeiting in China for the period 2002-
2008 (see Table 1). Within this period 1,492,814 cases became known to the Chinese 
authorities. The year with the largest number of cases detected was 2005 (347,000 cases). 
The number of counterfeit cigarette production sites that were found by the authorities for the 
particular period was 22,248, whereas 8,849 rolling machines used for the production of 
counterfeit cigarettes were seized along with more than 84 tons of tobacco leaves. Overall, 
30,825 individuals were arrested for cigarette counterfeiting, 10,742 of whom were sentenced.  
 
Table 1. Data relating to cigarette counterfeiting in China, 2002-2008 
 





















2002 320,000 2,476 1,375 13,000 497,000 4,075 (1,076 
sentenced) 
2003 220,000 2,575 1,531 -/-
4 530,000 3,539 (956 
sentenced) 
2004 269,000 2,805 1,890 -/-
5 687,000 4,215 (1,208 
sentenced) 
2005 347,000 2,908 1,608 12,000 730,000 5,336 (1,697 
sentenced) 




6 3,876 717 28,000 928,000 7,026 
(3,492 
sentenced) 
2008  1,3097 3,312 447  20,800  830,000 -/-8 
                                            
3 One unit (Jian) contains 50 sleeves of cigarettes (=10,000 sticks). 
4 No information available.  
5 No information available. 
6 This figure includes only the cases involving counterfeit cigarettes of monetary value of more than 50,000 
Yuan (approximately £ 4,480). 
7 This figure includes only the cases involving counterfeit cigarettes of monetary value of more than 500,000 





 22,248 8,849 84,400 5,109,000 30,825 
(10,742) 
 
Source: NTESB (2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008); China Tobacco Market (2009).  
 
The aforementioned official statistics possess a number of limitations in addition to the ones 
relating to the lack of knowledge of or ambiguity about the data collection procedures. The 
superficial and at points incomplete figures presented above do not provide a picture of the 
actual extent of cigarette counterfeiting in China, but only those cases that the Chinese 
authorities have come across. The „dark figure‟ may be considerable and the seized 
counterfeit cigarettes, as an official in one particular case is quoted as saying, may constitute 
“only the tip of the iceberg” (Shichang Bao, 2006). Data on 2007 and 2008 refer to cases 
involving merchandise of monetary value of more than 50,000 and 500,000 Yuan, 
respectively, which automatically excludes „smaller‟ cases. In addition, as is obvious, there 
have been increases and decreases in the number of cases as well as in the number of seized 
cigarette packs that do not allow for a possible trend to be discerned at least within these 
years. But even when trends could indeed be discerned, these could refer more to „contextual 
variables‟ (von Lampe, 2004) such as the level of intensity of law enforcement or resolution 
of the government. 
 
 
The production of counterfeit cigarettes 
Counterfeit cigarette manufacturing and trading originated from the southern coastal 
provinces of mainland China, Fujian and Guangdong, which borders Hong Kong and Macao. 
Particularly Yunxiao (Fujian province), and Chaoshan and Guangzhou (Guangdong province) 
are notorious for the production of counterfeit cigarettes. However, in recent years, due to the 
centrally-coordinated operations persistently carried out to curb cigarette counterfeiting in 
these areas, a number of counterfeiting businesses have been displaced to inland China. The 
counterfeit cigarette production phase can be divided into three stages: (a) acquiring raw 
materials, (b) manufacturing counterfeit cigarettes, and (c) packing counterfeit cigarettes. 
 
(a) Acquiring raw materials 
In China, counterfeit cigarettes can be produced from tobacco of various levels of quality, 
second-hand tobacco or even waste. Some of the chemicals which are used to process the low 
quality tobacco, such as sulphur and carbamide, are poisonous and may cause health 
problems to cigarette consumers.
9
 Low quality tobacco, directly and regularly bought from 
tobacco farmers, is usually used to make counterfeit cigarettes. Poor quality tobacco includes 
the totally unprocessed raw tobacco and musty/rotten tobacco which has to go through a 
process with sulphur and carbamide in order to look better (see Chongqing Chenbao, 2002). 
Counterfeiters obtain their tobacco from „irregular‟ channels as well. In a case that the 
authorities came across in Shenyang (Liaonin province) counterfeiters used dumped materials 
and „lajiyan‟ („rubbish tobacco‟) to make cigarettes. In addition, the counterfeiters disguised 
themselves as professional recyclers and bought damaged packaging, „unusable‟ wrapping 
paper and unsellable cigarettes from legitimate cigarette companies. Simultaneously, they 
employed „workers‟ to collect cigarette butts from the rubbish bins (Shidai Shangbao, 2002). 
                                                                                                                                       
8 No information available. 
9 Toxicological research suggests that counterfeit cigarettes expose smokers to heavy metals to a greater extent 
than authentic cigarettes produced by authorised manufacturers (see Pappas et al., 2007). 
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In some cases counterfeit cigarettes are also made of non-tobacco waste such as saw 
dusk, wood shavings and rotten vegetable leaves. In such cases, the cigarette wrapping paper, 
filters and other material are collected from the waste sites (see, for example, Hangzhou 
Ribao, 2003). In the municipality of Chongqing, rotten vegetable leaves were dried and 
processed with sulphur in order to be used instead of tobacco in counterfeit cigarettes 
(Chongqing Wanbao, 2002). It is not unusual, however, for counterfeit cigarettes to be made 
of good quality tobacco. Mr. Li Yang from the Central Inspection Team of the Beijing 
Tobacco Exclusive Sale Bureau commented that in some cases “the counterfeit cigarettes 
intercepted are of good quality. Consumers can hardly tell the difference between these 
counterfeit cigarettes and the genuine ones” (China News Agent, 2002). 
 
(b) Manufacturing counterfeit cigarettes  
The actual manufacturing of counterfeit cigarette requires rolling machines. In the past, 
purchasing cigarette rolling machines was extremely expensive. In order for costs to be cut 
down, counterfeiters bought used rolling machines from state-owned cigarette factories. The 
cost of these machines ranged from 600,000 to 1 million Yuan (approximately £ 53,000 to 
89,000) per piece. In recent years some machinery manufacturers have started to make 
copycat cigarette rolling machines, and the price has dropped significantly to around 200,000 
Yuan (approximately £ 18,000) per piece. Inevitably, the costs of cigarette manufacturing 
have been reduced accordingly. With the development and expansion of the cigarette 
counterfeiting businesses, counterfeiters, like their legitimate counterparts, have started to 
invest in more advanced equipment. Prior to 2004 only 30% of the cigarette machines seized 
were automatic whilst currently the counterfeit cigarette production line is 90% automatic 
(Nanfang Ribao, 2009).  
 
(c) Packing of counterfeit cigarettes 
Packing is an integral part of the counterfeit cigarette production process. There are legal and 
illegal enterprises, which specialise in packing only. The district of Guangzhou (Guangdong 
province) is believed to be the largest counterfeit cigarette packing centre in China. The 
packing only „schemes‟ usually operate at a relatively small scale. In Beijing a cigarette 
packing „factory‟ operated in a warehouse with only ten to twenty workers, who were 
manually packing loose cigarettes into the packaging of different popular brands (China 
News Agent, 2002). Different methods are used for the packing of counterfeit cigarettes in 
order for consumers to be deceived and detection to be avoided:  
 „Pick „n‟ mix‟ – genuine cigarettes are mixed with counterfeit ones in each pack. In a 
Changsha (Hunan province) case, „Baisha‟ cigarettes of this type were found. Inside 
the pack there were only seven genuine and thirteen fake cigarettes (Shangbao, 2002). 
However, this packing method appears to be rare in the cigarette counterfeiting 
business. 
 Genuine packs – counterfeit cigarettes are packed in used genuine packaging. This 
guarantees that health warnings are not misspelled, images are clear and other 
giveaways are not present. 
 Counterfeit packs – counterfeit cigarettes are placed in packaging resembling that of 
genuine brand cigarettes. The quality of counterfeit packs appears to have 
substantially improved from rather primitive beginnings in the 1990s, making it 
difficult nowadays to distinguish counterfeit from genuine cigarette packs (HM 
Treasury, 2004). 
 Unique format of counterfeit packs – In order to attract prospective customers‟ 
attention, some unique packaging is designed for counterfeit cigarettes of the most 
popular brands, which may not even exist for the genuine cigarettes. In Tianjin, the 
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gift boxes of „Zhonghua‟ cigarettes were sold in the market. Each box consisted of 
one sleeve of soft pack „Zhonghua‟ cigarettes, one hard-pack, one pack of 12 low-tar 
cigarettes and one pack of super-class „Zhonghua‟ cigarette along with an ashtray and 
a lighter. The gift boxes looked elegant and delicately made and a lay person could 
not tell they were faked; however, the state-owned „Zhonghua‟ cigarette company had 
never offered this type of gift boxes (Xinhua Net, 2008).  
 
The venues of counterfeit cigarette production and packing 
There is a large and diverse set of venues used for the production of counterfeit cigarettes. 
These include legitimate factories producing other commodities, warehouses, farms in rural 
and semi-rural areas, martial arts training schools, temples and private homes. A number of 
illicit production facilities have also been discovered in underground chambers and in 
mountain caves. As investigative journalist, Te-Ping Chen, reports that in Yunxiao factories 
are frequently hidden in dim, bricked-in facilities underground, accessible only via trapdoor 
and ladder, with the turf masking the tobacco scent (Chen, 2009; HM Treasury, 2004). 
 
The sale of counterfeit cigarettes 
Medium and large quantities of counterfeit cigarettes are sold in shopping centres, 
department stores, hotel-owned luxury shops and various legitimate small businesses such as 
groceries and kiosks. Most of these premises are licensed cigarette retailers that sell 
counterfeit cigarettes as well. For example, in a case in Fuzhou, a legitimate cigarette store 
displayed legal cigarettes on the shelves and counterfeit cigarettes (as well as smuggled 
foreign brands) were wholesaled (Fuzhou Wanbao, 2002). There is also, as was mentioned 
earlier, a large (and increasing) number of floating street-sellers, who trade counterfeit 
cigarettes outside night clubs, discos, restaurants and other night-time economy 
establishments or along the street and other public space.  
Although selling counterfeit cigarettes is a day-to-day routine business to sellers, and 
counterfeit cigarettes are sold at any time in virtually any public space to any interested 
customer, there are still preferable localities, venues, seasons and consumer groups that 
counterfeit cigarette sellers perceive to be ideal. Tourist spots are commonly chosen to sell 
counterfeit cigarettes because local cigarette brands are part of the tourist smokers‟ souvenir 
shopping in China. Tourists do not have knowledge of local brands and – with some 
exceptions - they cannot easily distinguish the counterfeit cigarettes from the genuine ones 
(Tobacco China Online, 2002). Other places where a convergence of sellers and potential 
buyers is guaranteed, such as ports, coach and railway stations, or even on transportation 
means, are chosen by counterfeit cigarettes sellers.  
Counterfeit cigarettes are often sold in village marketplaces. These marketplaces meet 
the demand of villagers, who have very little disposable income and cannot afford to buy 
quality, genuine cigarettes. Of great relevance here is the reluctance of legitimate cigarette 
sellers to trade in cheap legal cigarettes due to the small profit margin and the subsequent 
reduction or even cessation of production of cheap (or „low class‟) cigarettes by authorised 
cigarette factories. Finally, counterfeit cigarettes are sold outside mainland China, by 
mainland Chinese peddlers in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan (Lo, 2009), and through global 
illicit distribution channels on North American, European, Australian, Asian and African 
markets (Chen, 2009). According to an official from Yunxiao, “…the profit of selling 
counterfeit cigarettes abroad is 500% whilst that of selling them in the internal market is only 





Actors and patterns of cooperation in the cigarette counterfeiting business in 
China 
The cigarette counterfeiting business requires a degree of sophistication, and 
management of resources and labour. Towards this end, counterfeiting networks tend to have 
a naturally defined horizontal „structure‟. In fact there appear to be independent, autonomous 
„entities‟ involved in (a) production of counterfeit cigarettes and (b) sale of the merchandise 
and a constellation of actors, who are subcontracted in a way, around those two particular 
stages of the counterfeit cigarette business. In many cases, and in contrast to other contexts, 
the structures involved in the production of counterfeit cigarettes are hierarchical, and this is 
most probably a result of the fact that the production of counterfeit cigarettes involves 
someone who owns the (unauthorised) factory or workshop and workers who are employed 
by him. In essence, a counterfeit cigarette factory is almost identical to a legal cigarette 
factory. 
A number of individuals act as intermediaries who assist in the introduction of the 
merchandise into the market or who identify persons that can be subcontracted by the 
counterfeit cigarette producers and offer specialised services (e.g. packers, transporters etc.). 
The presence of the intermediaries was evidenced in many of the sources consulted. Thus 
once observers of the business move from one stage to the other, they realise that clearly 
defined structures and management systems along the overall counterfeit cigarette business 
do not exist. What merely exist are individuals or small groups forming temporary 
collaborations in order for their shared objective, making profit, to materialise. Unfortunately, 
the available data cannot offer additional information as to how these collaborations emerge 
in the first instance. 
What is also extremely important to note is that in many cases the production phase of 
the business is „demand-based‟; counterfeit cigarette production is based upon an order. The 
persons, who order the counterfeit cigarettes, however, should be viewed as the „initiators‟, or 
the initial customers of the business rather than the „organisers‟ of the process. 
There is a range of individuals from various socio-economic and geographic 
backgrounds, who directly or indirectly engage in the cigarette counterfeiting business in 
various ways and play different roles in the counterfeiting process, according to competencies 
and skills. Similar to other contexts (see, for instance, Antonopoulos, 2008), not all actors are 
present in all counterfeiting schemes, and one actor may assume more than one role. The 
different roles are as follows: 
 Tobacco farmers. They provide the primary raw material for the business. They have 
an incentive to sell their product irrespective of whether the buyer is an illegal 
entrepreneur since, as was indicated earlier, there is a surplus of tobacco in China. 
 Unauthorised manufacturers. They have the capital to invest, consider the 
counterfeiting of cigarettes a lucrative business and engage in running illegal cigarette 
manufacturing sites. Some of the unauthorised manufacturers are individuals from 
families with a tradition in small-scale cigarette-making. For example, in Yunxiao, 
„home cigarette-making‟ has a tradition since the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912). It was 
virtually absent from 1949, when the PRC was established, until the late 1970s when 
it re-emerged as a normal entrepreneurial activity. In terms of the quantities of 
counterfeit cigarette introduced to the market unauthorised manufacturers are the 
equivalent to the wholesalers in the non-counterfeit illegal cigarette markets. 
 Intermediaries. In those cases in which the production of counterfeit cigarettes is 
based upon demand, it is the intermediaries, individuals who link manufacturers and 
prospective customers, by collecting orders through their social networks and then 
placing the order to the manufacturer. Intermediaries also link other participants in the 
business such as manufacturer and transporters. Intermediaries may not be involved in 
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the actual manufacture or sale of counterfeit cigarette but are what Morselli and 
Giguere (2006) call „critical actors‟. 
 Specialised workers. Former workers of state-owned cigarette factories. Many 
workers have been made redundant from the state-owned factories and have been 
employed by cigarette counterfeiting entrepreneurs particularly in the southern 
regions of China, such as Fujian, Guangdong and Guangxi provinces (Caijin, 2008). 
In one of the cases we came across, all 30 workers in a counterfeit cigarette 
manufacturing site were former workers of state-owned cigarette factories in Hunan 
and Anhui provinces (Guizhou Dushibao, 2002). These specialised workers who are 
basically tobacco experts or „recipe specialists‟ enjoy more benefits than simple 
workers because of their technical expertise, which is functional for the counterfeiting 
business. To seek long-term commitment to the illegal enterprise, counterfeit cigarette 
manufacturers pay relatively high salaries to specialised workers (Caijin, 2008). 
 Packaging producers. Packing materials, such as boxes, cigarette packs, wrapping foil, 
plastic wrapping and other packing accessories are produced by individuals and small 
legal businesses specialised on this part of the process. In some cases authorised and 
unauthorised cigarette manufacturers are also the customers of the same packaging 
producers.   
 Trademark and barcode printers. They make packaging trademarks, barcodes and 
even counter-counterfeiting fiscal marks available to counterfeiters. In September 
2007 a printing workshop was found in Shantou city of Guangdong province, and 
several printing machines as well as 414,000 empty cigarette packs with printed 
trademarks were seized (Shantou Ribao, 2007). These services are not necessarily 
provided by professional printers only; they can also be offered by sole individuals in 
their own house. Liaoshen Wanbao (2002), for instance, reports the case of a 60-year 
old woman specialising in spraying barcodes on „Zhonghua‟ and „Xiaoxiongmao‟ 
packs.   
 Non-specialised workers. These are usually internal migrants - including children - 
from the countryside, who are used as cheap labour for primarily menial tasks such as 
cleaning the tobacco, carrying the merchandise from the factory to trucks or other 
means of transportation or even collecting cigarette butts and packs from rubbish bins 
and the street to be used for the manufacturing of counterfeit cigarettes. In many cases, 
these non-specialised workers are introduced to a „short migration‟ system of work 
that has been adopted in the cigarette counterfeiting business. This basically entails 
the workers not being allowed to leave the workshop until the end of their „contract‟, 
working in double shifts in operations that run 24-hour a day, and not being allowed 
to use mobile phones (e.g. Changjiang Yancaobao, 2002). Caijin (2008) reports that a 
large-scale Yunxiao counterfeit cigarette site was built underground. All workers 
were taken from the train station to the site in a closed container, so that they would 
not be aware of the exact location of the site. A person was assigned to shop for 
necessities for the workers, who would be transported to the train station in the closed 
container after the termination of their „contract‟.  
 Warehousemen/storage providers. Warehouses and other legitimate storage services 
are used by counterfeiters for storing the merchandise. Some unusual premises have 
been reported. For example, in one of the cases we came across, a pigsty was used to 
store counterfeit cigarettes. The front of the pigsty was occupied by pigs and at the 
back, and underneath the pile of pig food, the counterfeit cigarettes were hidden, 
while two hunt dogs were guarding the premises (Sichuan Ribao, 2002). 
 „Security guards‟. To avoid detection of the manufacturing sites, individuals are 
employed to carry out physical surveillance. In a case in Yunxiao, security guards 
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were hired to be present at each junction of the country road towards the 
manufacturing site. These security guards were equipped with walkie-talkies to report 
any suspicious activities (Caijin, 2008). In another case in Inner Mongolia, cameras 
were installed above an underground cigarette factory and individuals were hired for 
the control room (Xinhua Net, 2005).  
 Transporters. Transporters play a crucial role in the cigarette counterfeiting business 
from the moment the merchandise leaves the manufacturing site. The ways of 
transportation for counterfeit cigarettes vary. Locally, counterfeit cigarettes are 
transported by vans, cars and motorbikes. In Nannin (Guangxi province), a man 
transported 50 sleeves of „Santa‟ cigarettes on his motorbike (Nanguo Zaobao, 2002). 
Nationally, legitimate transport companies, logistic centres and individual 
(professional or non-professional) lorry drivers are hired by counterfeiters although 
sometimes the transporters are not aware of the illegal merchandise. In some of the 
cases transportation companies are set up specifically for the purpose of delivering 
counterfeit cigarettes. Merchandise is often concealed among other commodities. In 
Wenzhou (Zhejiang Province), for instance, 298 units of counterfeit cigarettes were 
disguised as boxes of insoles (Wenzhou Dushibao, 2002). Counterfeit cigarettes are 
also delivered by air through air-cargo companies. In Guangzhou there were more 
than ten air-cargo agencies around the airport amongst which eight answered that they 
would have no problem to deliver counterfeit cigarettes when a fake request was 
made by a journalist (Nanfang Ribao, 2009). Quantities of counterfeit cigarettes are 
also transported to markets abroad usually by ship from important commercial hubs in 
the east and south of the country such as Shenzhen and Shanghai (Caijin, 2008). 
 Sellers. There are two types of counterfeit cigarette sellers. The first type is the street-
seller. In most of the cases street-sellers, particularly in urban centres, are internal 
migrants from the countryside and unemployed city residents. Some of them work as 
sellers of counterfeit cigarettes parallel to their legitimate (or in some cases 
illegitimate) job. In one of the cases we came across, a seller used to work 
simultaneously as a street shoe-repairer. It is also very common for females to be 
involved in the street sale of counterfeit cigarettes. Increasingly, large numbers of 
street-sellers act as „entrepreneurs‟ by depositing a small amount to purchase a 
number of counterfeit cigarette packs or sleeves. The second type is the seller 
operating in legitimate enterprises and with larger quantities. For example, in Fuzhou 
(Fujian province), a grocery had a permit to trade in tobacco products. However, 
along with trading legitimate cigarettes the owners of the business were also 
distributing counterfeit cigarettes (Fuzhou Wanbao, 2002).  
 „Look outs‟. The role of „look outs‟ has been identified in the cigarette black markets 
of other countries (Antonopoulos, 2008; von Lampe, 2003). „Look outs‟ „patrol‟ the 
area of street-selling and warn the sellers about the presence of uniformed law 
enforcement agents as well as journalists and TV crews.  
 Corrupt public officials. Having power, information, and powerful social networks, 




Counterfeit cigarettes business and corruption  
There are basically three forms of corruption of Chinese public officials which relate to the 
cigarette counterfeiting business: 
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(a) Active engagement – this is the extreme form of corruption in cigarette counterfeiting, 
in which public officials take advantage of their power due to their position, 
specialised knowledge and social networks to establish cigarette counterfeiting 
manufacturing sites. In an Inner Mongolia (Neimenggu) case, the four owners of a 
counterfeit cigarette manufacturing site were officials of the local Bureau of Industry 
and Commerce. One of them was also the former head of the Market Unit in the 
Fengyuan Bureau of Industry and Commerce (Xinhua Net, 2005). 
 
(b)  „Protective Umbrella‟ – Public officials may play a role of a „protective umbrella‟ 
(„baohusan‟) for cigarette counterfeiters. For various reasons corrupt officials protect 
cigarette counterfeiters and intervene in case cigarette counterfeiters are arrested. This 
„protective umbrella‟ allows for the termination of the illegal business to be extremely 
short-termed and the business virtually uninterrupted, irrespective of the number of 
detections. As an officer employed in the Shanxi tobacco management authority 
confessed to a Shichang Bao newspaper journalist: 
 
“There are several illegal cigarette traders in every city of our province, and they all 
have close relationship with the officials... The dealers and officials have an alliance 
and they share the illicit profits. Counterfeit cigarette dealers control the counterfeit 
cigarette markets in Taiyuan and the peripheral cities. When things go wrong, 
someone would come out and exculpate the illicit dealers from trouble” (Shichang 
Bao, 2006).  
 
In another case involving the large-scale production of counterfeit cigarettes, an 
individual reported the details of a manufacturing site to the local law enforcement 
agency and obtained his reward. After months the counterfeit cigarette manufacturer 
was still in business (Caijin, 2008).  
 
(c) „Turning a blind eye‟: public officials may not be directly engaged in cigarette 
counterfeiting or in providing a „protective umbrella‟ to participants in the counterfeit 
cigarette business; however, some of them may ignore the activities of cigarette 
counterfeiters in exchange for financial rewards. In some cases a financial reward 
may not even need to be available, and this appears to be the case in relatively small, 
primarily rural and semi-rural localities in which there are pre-existing social 
relationships between counterfeiters and public officials. 
In this context it should be noted that provincial governments in China are being treated as 
enterprises by the central government in terms of economic performance and success (see 
Chen, 2002). Since cigarette counterfeiting, through the use of locally grown raw tobacco, is 
a source of revenue for the provincial government and provides employment for many 
individuals, local governments seem to be reluctant to crack down on counterfeiting 
businesses especially when the unauthorised production relates to international brands (e.g. 
Marlboro, Benson & Hedges) or brands that are not produced in the particular province, and 
therefore does not cause a conflict of interests with local authorised manufacturers (Yao, 
2006; White, 1996). In French‟s (2007) words, “it is the froth in the economy that 
[counterfeiting] creates that counts most, not niceties like intellectual property or fussy 
product safety details”. It should be noted however, that corruption was not present in all 
cigarette counterfeiting cases we came across and thus, similar to other contexts, corruption is 
not necessarily to be considered as an essential feature of the counterfeiting business. It is 
also important to acknowledge that the Chinese government, partly to protect its own brands, 
partly in compliance with international obligations and aided by tobacco corporations, has 
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made increasing efforts to crack down on cigarette counterfeiting thereby creating a more 




Counterfeit cigarettes business and violence  
As previous research on illegal markets has shown, violence does not occupy a central part in 
the business but is a sign of “market dysfunction and instability” (Pearson and Hobbs, 2001: 
42). Although violence is present in the illegal cigarette business in various contexts (see 
Antonopoulos, 2008), it does not constitute an integral part in the market. This also appears 
to be the case with the cigarette counterfeiting business in China; however, what can be 
observed in China is a higher prevalence of violence in the business. Violence and/or threat 
of violence are directed towards various types of individuals.  In China there is a group of 
people who act as professional informants, they provide information on counterfeiters and 
counterfeiting activities to the authorities, and they are rewarded for the relevant information 
they provide. Within this context, gangs are hired by counterfeit cigarette manufacturers to 
attack law enforcement informants. One of the numerous cases which received much media 
attention is of Zeng Changsheng and two fellow informants, who used to act as professional 
informants for the tobacco authority. Zeng Changsheng‟s fellow informants lost their lives 
while he lost one ear, which resulted in him stopping to work for the authorities (Caijin, 
2008). An official from Guangdong Provincial Tobacco Exclusive Sale Bureau commented 
on the killing of the two informants: 
 
“…it is known that cigarette counterfeiters are using underworld criminal gangs to protect 
their operations. Once being identified, informants are physically tortured… and even 
kidnapped. But it is shocking that the counterfeiters were so brutal that they dared to beat 
informants to death” (Fuzhou News Net, 2005).  
 
Violence and threats of violence are sometimes used towards law enforcement officials by 
cigarette counterfeiters. In one of the relevant cases we came across, threatening phone calls 
were made and text messages were sent to police investigators and some of their family 
members during the investigation. One of the investigators received more than thirty 
threatening messages on a single day (Dongya Jinmao News, 2008). Counterfeit cigarette 
entrepreneurs may also impose violence towards tobacco authority officials and police 
officers when the actual seizures of rolling machines, raw tobacco and counterfeit cigarettes 
are carried out (see Jianghuai Chenbao, 2002).  
What is perhaps unique in the counterfeit business in China is violence towards 
buyers. In a recent fatal incident that occurred in Guangzhou, the capital city of Guangdong 
province, a man was beaten to death by four security guards of a legal establishment in which 
a shop selling counterfeit cigarettes was located, after he protested about the quality of the 
cigarettes bought (Xingxi Shibao, 2009). This was one of the incidents that raised serious 
public concerns about cigarette counterfeiting in China.  
The counterfeit cigarette business as a whole and individuals involved in cigarette 
counterfeiting however, can be victims of violence or threat of violence, and extortion. 
Sellers, for example, are often robbed of their profits. There are also different forms of 
extortion from „protection fees‟ to „rent fees‟ paid to criminal gangs that allow the 
continuation of the business. According to Nanfang Ribao (2009), in Wuxianqiao, the 
infamous cigarette counterfeiting centre in Guangzhou, each of the 3,000 counterfeit cigarette 
traders was required to pay a „protection fee‟ of 500 Yuan (approximately £ 45) per month to 
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extortionists as a compulsory charge for their „protection‟ services. Violence was often used 




The counterfeit cigarette business highlights “the enormous symbolic presence that images of 
organised crime have in popular discourse” (Sheptycki, 2008: 23). Our study suggests that, 
unlike popular representations, cigarette counterfeiting in China, just as with illegal tobacco-
related activities in other contexts, is characterised by a high degree of heterogeneity and a 
range of organising the business (see van Duyne, 2003; von Lampe, 2003; 2005; 
Antonopoulos, 2008). There appear to be independent „entities‟ involved in different parts of 
the business and actors who are subcontracted to provide commodities and services about the 
process. 
There is a relatively high level of sophistication in the business, not so much however, 
in relation to the links between actors or stages of the business but more in relation to the 
technical sophistication necessary for the production of counterfeit cigarettes. Relationships 
between actors in the business are very often based on a customer-supplier relationship or a 
„business-to-business market‟, which is a very common characteristic of the Chinese (legal 
and illegal) economy (see Simons, 2009).  
A large number of individuals are involved in illegal tobacco-related activities simply 
because this offers them an entrepreneurial opportunity in a relatively low-risk environment, 
and in the absence of state welfare provisions that address the income inequalities and 
economic exclusion facing, particularly, internal migrants (see Wing Lo and Jiang, 2006).  
The role of corruption and violence in the cigarette counterfeiting business is not to be 
underestimated. Corruption, although not mentioned in all counterfeiting cases we 
encountered, seems to be at least a facilitating factor of a large part of the business. In 
addition, although violence could attract the unnecessary attention of law enforcement, it is 
nevertheless more prevalent in the counterfeit cigarette market in China than in other contexts. 
This perhaps highlights the fact that the American and European experience of illegal 
markets may not be entirely compatible with the extremely diverse Chinese context. It also 
highlights the dynamism of illegal markets in this particular country, and calls for additional, 
preferably empirical research in this „exemplary society‟ (Bakken, 2000). 
We mentioned earlier that the illegal cigarette business in general and counterfeiting 
in particular emerged as a problem in China in the late 1970s and early 1980s when the „open 
door‟ policy and economic reform made profit and economic development a national 
movement (quanming jingshang) (Liu, 2005: 619). The economic reform facilitated the 
emergence of cigarette counterfeiting in a variety of ways. Firstly, there was the paradox of 
the private sector becoming increasingly dynamic while at the same time the tobacco industry 
continued to remain a state monopoly. It proved extremely difficult for private entrepreneurs 
to become involved in the huge and highly lucrative Chinese market, and the smuggling and 
counterfeiting of cigarettes provided the only alternative avenues to market entry. 
Secondly, the transition to a market economy and the subsequent restructuring of the 
tobacco industry led to the technical facilitation of the cigarette counterfeit business by 
setting free two important types of resources: skilled workers and production machinery. 
Simultaneously, the reluctance of licensed cigarette sellers to trade in cheap legal cigarettes 
due to the small profit margin and the subsequent reduction or even cessation of production 
of cheap cigarettes by local authorised factories, despite the demand for cheap cigarettes, 
created a niche in the market that was filled by counterfeiters. It seems that in the case of 
counterfeit cigarettes, authorised manufacturers and the state have been „victims‟ of their 
profit-oriented mentality. Thirdly, the trade liberalisation which has been an important pillar 
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of the economic reforms not only allowed for an increased volume of legitimate trade but 
also created a façade for illegitimate trade (Andreas, 1999), of which counterfeit cigarettes 
are an important aspect. 
However, it is not only the opening of the Chinese market and economy to the rest of 
the world that has facilitated the booming of the cigarette counterfeiting business; it is also 
the other way around. The most populated country of the world has an annual development 
rate of approximately 10%, which is four times higher than the average development rate of 
developed world economies. This development is „fed‟ to a great extent by the country‟s 
cheap labour, which along with the governmentally maintained low exchange rate for the 
Chinese currency, directly or indirectly support the export of Chinese products. Counterfeit 
cigarettes, like other licit and illicit commodities, fall within the category of cheap exported 
goods. However, counterfeit cigarettes are also an indication of the importance of tobacco for 
China and the commodity‟s surplus. The counterfeit cigarette business has informalised the 
process of manufacturing cigarettes to an extent that a comparative advantage has been 
created for unauthorised manufacturers over authorised Chinese and international 
manufacturers (see Castells and Portes, 1989). 
The way in which the legal and the illegal intersect is also evident in the Chinese 
counterfeit cigarette business. Cigarette counterfeiters benefit from the legal sector and some 
legal businesses also benefit from cigarette counterfeiters in various ways. The case of the 
air-companies mentioned earlier is just one striking example of this symbiosis. 
When it comes to the links between China as the counterfeit cigarette source country 
and (primarily) western markets, the role of the western states as the ultimate “market 
determiners” (van Duyne, 2007) by imposing prohibitive taxes on cigarettes, a socially and 
culturally-embedded commodity, has to be highlighted. High taxation imposed by 
governments has contributed to an environment of demand for cheap cigarettes, which has 
been exploited by entrepreneurs capitalising on huge price differentials and “global market 
ambiguities” (Hornsby and Hobbs, 2007: 565). Overall, cigarette counterfeiting in China, and 
by extension the rest of the world, appears to be an integral part of the neo-liberal 
marketplace jigsaw in the country (and beyond), and a result of an uneasy symbiosis between 
state planning, local government competition emphasising profit, personal greed, aspirations 
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